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Relative Sovereignty of the Twenty First
Century
BY IVAN SIMONOVIC*
Introduction
The concept of state sovereignty, originally developed in
constitutional law to define supreme authority and distribution of
power within a state, has more recently been introduced into the area
of international law to define the position and prerogatives of states
in international relations. Therefore, for analytical purposes it is
useful to distinguish between "internal" and "external" aspects of
state sovereignty. To understand better the transformation of the
external aspect of state sovereignty, which is the focus of our
attention, it is very useful to note that it follows the same pattern
already observed in researching the transformation of its internal
aspect. Just as internal sovereignty historically evolved from
monarchical sovereignty, based on monopoly, into popular
sovereignty marked by power-sharing and a balance of power,
sovereignty of the state in international relations is changing from a
system of international relations based on concentration of power in
states alone (and balance of power between them), into a system of
power-sharing and balance of power between states and non-state
actors. These non-state actors, whose influence is steadily increasing,
include international organizations and associations of various types,
multinational companies and international non-governmental
organizations. Of course, we are addressing general trends: there are
still states headed by monopolistic power-holders, or states, which, for
various reasons, resist transformation of international relations
towards power-sharing with non-state actors. However, in general,
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the quality of state sovereignty in the contemporary world, both in
internal and external relations, has fundamentally changed: state
sovereignty is no longer absolute.
Discussion
During the last six years that I have spent as the Permanent
Representative of Croatia to the United Nations ("UN") in New
York, there were few issues that provoked as much controversy and
debate as the principle of state sovereignty and its corollaries. As a
professor of jurisprudence in my previous life, it was interesting to
compare how law schools dealt with the. concept of state sovereignty
with the various positions governments and non-governmental actors
took on more practical issues of state sovereignty in the UN setting.
The UN is an arena where conflicting views on state sovereignty
are not merely an academic issue, but an issue of the highest practical
importance. When crisis situations arise, the interpretation of state
sovereignty is often a decisive issue in determining whether
international, UN or other intervention is warranted. The North
Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") intervention in Kossova
serves as a good example. Regarded by some as a clear case of
desperately needed humanitarian intervention, others view the
Kossova intervention as an armed aggression and violation of jus
cogens principles of state sovereignty, non-intervention, and non-use
of force.' Other multinational interventions that aimed to protect
civilians against intolerable persecution (in internal, or at least
partially internal conflicts), such as in Iraq (the establishment of a no-
flight zone to protect the Kurdish population from attacks), Haiti,
Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina and East Timor, have provoked
similar opposition from critics of such actions by multinational forces.
As the debate between state sovereignty and the protection of human
rights continues, the UN struggles with defining state sovereignty in
the context of the above crisis situations.
The principle of non-interference in the "internal affairs of a
state," a historical corollary of state sovereignty, is being challenged
1. For a list of articles arguing that NATO intervention violated jus cogens, see
Jianming Shen, National Sovereignty and Human Rights in a Positive Law Context,
26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 417, 418 n.2 (2000). It is interesting to note that the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY") did not withdraw its application submitted to the
International Court of Justice against NATO countries that participated in the
intervention, not even after the fall of Milosevic and formal announcement of the
new government that they would like to join NATO's Partnership for Peace.
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by the international community's belief in its "responsibility to
protect."2  Humanitarian interventions are by definition intrusive.
These actions utilize military force and other coercive means to
intervene in conflicts without the consent of the state that is either
participating in or too weak to prevent persecutions, large-scale grave
human rights abuses, and other sufferings.3 The posited justification
for humanitarian intervention is that people matter most, and that
states, as well as the rest of international community, have some
obligation to protect them. Therefore, if the state fails to perform its
duty, it is the duty of other actors to help the victims.4
Some authors attribute this change in the object of protection
from states to people to the evolution of state sovereignty towards
popular sovereignty. This theory implies that in the contemporary
world the principle of sovereignty can no longer be used as a shield
against the actual suppression of popular sovereignty! According to
this point of view, a third-party state's intervention to restore the
power of a democratically-elected government, or to restore
democracy and the respect of basic human rights in another state, can
be considered legitimate. Yet there are also opposing views, of
course, which label the tendency toward international interventionism
as a remnant of the colonial attitude, an attempt to create a world
order based on values and interests particular to the most powerful
states, or as simply dangerous.6
While humanitarian intervention may be the most drastic
example, there are many other dilemmas regarding the
transformation and limits of state sovereignty.
During the last fifty years human rights have steadily evolved
from the "internal affairs" of individual states to a globally
2. "Responsibility to protect" sounds better than "right to intervene." On the
concept of "responsibility to protect," see INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
RESEARCH CENTRE, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: REPORT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (2001).
3. See T. Modibo Ocran, The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of
Robust Peacekeeping, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1 (2002).
4. See Shunji Kobayashi, State Sovereignty in the 21st Century: Political and
Strategic Implications, STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, CONCEPT,
RELEVANCE AND LIMITS, PROC. OF AN INT'L SEMINAR (July 23-24,2001), available at
http://wwwv.stratmag.com/issue2Aug-15/pageO5.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2002).
5. See W. Michael Reisman, Comment, Sovereignty and Human Rights in
Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866, 871-72 (1990).
6. See Oscar Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J.
INT'L L. 645 (1984).
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guaranteed good, which is now protected through various
mechanisms.7 Besides the influence of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights on national legislation, they include multilateral
treaties and the unusually fast development of customary
international law in this area.' Treaty-related and other monitoring
mechanisms include the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
and special rapporteurs for individual country situations.9
A number of assumptions derived from the traditional concept of
sovereignty and relative to international law are increasingly being
challenged."0 The development of the above-mentioned mechanisms
for protecting human rights directly confront the view that no one can
interfere with the way states treat their own citizens. The
establishment of ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, and the adoption of their statutes containing relevant legal
provisions by the Security Council of the UN, runs against the
principle that states control the creation and implementation of
international law." When the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
("FRY") was forced to respect the ad hoc tribunal's statute through
the threat of international sanctions, where was the "consent of the
state," which is traditionally regarded as a prerequisite for the
emergence of new rules of international law? Also, provisions of the
statute of the International Criminal Court ("ICC") in some cases
extend jurisdiction to citizens of states unwilling to be bound by the
statute. Notably, when the United States protested against the
possibility that their citizens could be extradited to the ICC, they de
7. See Johan van der Vyver, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Constitutional
and International Law, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 321 (1991). See also Antony
D'Amato, Human Rights as Part of Customary International Law: A Plea for Change
of Paradigms, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 47,75-80 (1995-1996).
8. Long and universal acceptance no longer appears to be a prerequisite for the
development of a custom in the field of human rights - general acceptance is
considered sufficient. For evidence on the growing importance of customary
international human rights law, see Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of
Customary International Human Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1995-
1996).
9. For an evaluation of the efficiency of human rights law in practice and an
indication of weaknesses and inconsistencies in spite of the development of
monitoring mechanisms, see Douglass Cassel, International Human Rights Law in
Practice: Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?, 2 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 121 (2001).
10. For the list of corollaries of the principle of state sovereignty, see Shen, supra
note 1, at 419-20.
11. See Ivan imonovic, The Role of ICTY in the Development of International
Criminal Adjudication, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 440 (1999).
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facto opposed the trend they helped to develop, which favored
international interventionism in the area of human fights protection
and punishment of the gravest abuses thereof.
Another manifestation of this new approach to state sovereignty
is the transformation of the UN peace-keeping operations. Since the
end of the Cold War, the number of UN-mandated operations has
increased and their character has changed. Traditionally, the peace-
keeping function was to separate each side of the conflict and observe
whether each side could respect the provisions of relevant
agreements. Increasingly, peace-keeping also includes a number of
post-conflict peace-building activities, including the organization of
democratic elections, the establishment of rudimentary public
administration and the creation of activities aimed at economic
revitalization.12 For example, in East Timor, this type of multi-
dimensional peace-keeping role is not in dispute. Although under
heavy international pressure, Indonesian authorities were ready to
accept Timor's independence at the end of the process. Yet in
Kossova, on the other hand, FRY authorities have systematically
blamed the UN for the extent of its involvement, which allegedly
included elements of state-building and encouraged secession.
The UN is, of course, at the epicenter of these debates.
Globalization and increased mutual interdependence obviously
require better coordination of various actors, but many states are
reluctant to transfer their prerogatives to the international fora.
Some states resist any limitation of sovereignty in order to continue
domestic human rights abuses, while others resist because they
genuinely fear that the misuse of international interventions can lead
to foreign domination. Additionally, the United States, as the only
contemporary super-power, often prefers unilateralism to
multilateralism when handling sensitive matters. By not joining the
Kyoto protocol,13 the United States refused to be bound by
international standards for environmental protection. Also, the
United States has preserved the right to attack Iraq unilaterally if
unable to mobilize the international community to take action against
Iraq's alleged development and stockpiling of weapons of mass
12. The scope of these activities falls outside the mandate of the Security Council
as set forth in the UN Charter. See U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 2. In the future, the
Economic and Social Council - if and when it proves capable of doing so - should be
in charge of post-conflict peace-building.
13. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 10, 1997,37 I.L.M. 22.
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destruction.
Coming from a small country with a short history of statehood, I
sympathize with countries that fear for loss of independence, who are
small or young and still fragile, or those traumatized by their history
of foreign domination.'4 These countries often perceive sovereignty
as a shield that protects their independence and preserves their equal
footing with others. 5  However, I also was often outraged by
violations of human rights and grave breaches of humanitarian law
that persisted because key players in the international community
lacked either the willingness or the instruments with which to protect
the innocent victims of human rights abuses.
During the 1990s, conflicts between states killed approximately
220,000 people, which represented a decrease of nearly two-thirds the
number of people killed during the 1980s. However, during the same
period, approximately 3.6 million people died in internal conflicts
within states. As a result, the number of refugees and internally
displaced persons increased by fifty percent. 6 It has been estimated
that during the twentieth century, governments killed 170 million of
their own citizens." This number is greater than the total number of
people killed in wars between states, including the two "world wars."
Faced with these realities, how can we afford to consider major
contemporary humanitarian threats as something in which the
international community cannot involve itself? After all, what is this
precious sovereignty that makes us so cautious and hesitant?
The core issue of sovereignty - whether we speak about its
internal or external aspect - is a question of distribution of power.
The concept of sovereignty first developed in constitutional law as an
attribute of the highest authority and power-holder within a state.
14. It is a paradox that the concept of sovereignty, initially developed as a
European concept to guide relations between European powers, and not always
observed by them in their relations with non-European states, later turned into a
"line of defense" for developing countries against foreign intervention. See Iyer
Chokila, Inaugural Address, STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, CONCEPT,
RELEVANCE AND LIMITS, PROC. OF AN INT'L SEMINAR (July 23-24, 2001), available at
http:l/meadev.nic.in./speeches/fs-ju123.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2002).
15. Qin Huasun, the Chinese Ambassador to the UN, has stated that sovereignty
is the last "defense screen" of small and weak countries against foreign bullying, and
that there would be no peace if that screen were broken. See Shen, supra note 1, at
436.
16. See U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002:
DEEPENING DEMOCRACY IN A FRAGMENTED WORLD 2 (2002).
17. See id. at 6.
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Bodin's articulation of the concept of sovereignty reflects a specific
historic situation: the desire to create the highest concentration of
executive, legislative and judicial power in hands of a monarch." This
interpretation of sovereignty within a state embodies corresponding
formulation of the structure of international relations as elaborated
by Grotius, where states are the only actors possessing a monopoly of
power in the international arena. Sovereign states are mutually
equal, respect each other's monopoly in handling internal affairs, and
enter into international obligations only on the basis of consensus."
The transition from the sovereignty of monarchs to popular
sovereignty is a shift from power concentrated and monopolized in
the hands of a monarch to power distributed between citizens. On a
technical level, the exercise of popular sovereignty through the
division of power between the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches reflects a tendency to replace concentrated power with
distributed and balanced power.
While the preceding is nothing new, it is surprising how
neglected the use of our knowledge is on the changes in power
relations within a state and internal aspects of sovereignty; in the
research of trends of transformation of international relations; and in
examining external aspects of state sovereignty. In fact, international
relations are experiencing a similar process of transformation: from
an exclusively state-dominated system where states are the exclusive
power-holders into a more complex system where states,
international organizations, multinational corporations and non-
governmental organizations ("NGOs") are sharing the balance of
power.
This transformation is heavily influenced by the process of
globalization. Global interdependence in security, trade, finance,
crime, health and environmental issues limits the feasibility of state
sovereignty as a viable solution to conflicts that arise. Consensual
obligations, such as international treaties, are self-imposed limitations
18. See JEAN BODIN, SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 25 (M. Tooley trans.
1967).
19. It is questionable Whether the described extreme form of concentration of
power within the state, and on states in international relations, ever existed in
practice at all. There were always certain limiting factors to the concentration of
power within a state, or on states within the system of international relations, for
example, the role of the church. Regarding the idea of distribution of certain
sovereign rights to different social actors, the Dutch concept of souvereniteit in eigen
sfeer might be particularly helpful. See Johan D. van der Vyver, supra note 7, at 343.
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on state sovereignty. However, these limitations are no longer
sufficient.2' International relations are increasingly influenced by the
emergence of new actors that limit sovereignty of states and create a
balance of power that ensures better protection of global interests.
Citizens, who have developed a feeling of global citizenship in
addition to their state citizenship, are seeking new ways to protect
their interests. They prefer to have some of their interests protected
on the state (central or local) level, and others protected on the
regional (such as the European Union or African Union) or global
level. Also, on national, and especially international levels, states are
no longer the only actors; civil societies, NGOs and business
communities are gaining importance.
Just as executive, legislative and judicial organs were historically
related to each other on a national level, states, international
organizations and associations, multilateral corporations and NGOs
are now also limiting each other's power on a global level. NGOs,
often supported by the media, push states to do what administrations
would never do on their own: for example, give up land mines or
accept the jurisdiction of the ICC.2 On the other hand, states and
international organizations are cooperating with NGOs to prevent
multinational corporations from exploiting child labor in developing
countries.2
A new balance of power is being acknowledged and various
actors in the international arena are learning to cooperate. During
the preparatory process and through the work of the International
Conference on Financing for Development (Monterrey 2002) and the
World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg 2002),
20. Interpreting treaties as self-imposed limitations of state sovereignty
contradicts the view expressed by the Permanent Court of International Justice in
S.S. Wimbledon that "the right of entering into international engagements is an
attribute of State sovereignty." S.S. Wimbledon, 1922-1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1 at
25 (1923). However, the point is that treaties - however qualified - are simply not
sufficient global coordinating tools anymore. More explicit limitations of state
sovereignty and more efficient coordinating mechanisms are needed for practical
purposes.
21. In 1914, there were 1083 international NGOs. By 2000, there were more than
37,000, of which 2150 have consultative status within the UN Economic and Social
Council ("ECOSOC"). See U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 16, at 10.
22. See Jenness Duke, Note, Enforcement of Human Rights on Multi-National
Corporations: Global Climate, Strategies and Trends for Compliance, 28 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 339 (2000). For a useful case study, see Marc J. Monte, Corporate
Factory/Supplier Monitoring Programs and the Failure of International Law in
Regulating Indian Factory Conditions, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1125 (2001).
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both major UN events after the Millennium Summit, NGOs and
business sector representatives were accorded equal status with
states.' The UN Economic and Social Council ("ECOSOC") 2002
Spring Meeting with the Bretton Woods Institution followed the
same procedure. Finally, in May 2002, the Forum on Indigenous
Issues was established as a unique UN body, consisting of eight
experts representing governments, and eight experts representing
indigenous peoples.24
However rational, the process of increasing power sharing
between states, international organizations, NGOs, and multinational
corporations in international relations has met serious opposition.
The problem is not simply a matter of the resistance of small and
vulnerable states who are afraid of losing their sovereignty, but is also
a problem of the ambition of the United States - as the only
remaining superpower - to remain the sole sovereign state in the
international system of limited state sovereignty. The United States
can stubbornly insist on the primacy of U.S. domestic law over
international law and can threaten to use force if a U.S. citizen is
apprehended by the ICC because they are big enough, rich enough
and strong enough. However, this policy is harmful for both the
United States and the emerging world order.
Contemporary global challenges require global responses and
the involvement of various social actors in addition to states.
September 11, 2001 was an alarm bell in this respect. Even the most
powerful states are vulnerable, and it does not pay to go alone. If the
United States and other developed countries want a successful
international coalition against terrorism, they must address its root
causes and take part in a coalition for global development.
Globalization and increased mutual dependence should be
accompanied by the spread of global ethics, based on principles of
tolerance, mutual respect, and above all, solidarity.
In my capacity as the President of the ECOSOC, I have
witnessed many situations where the lack of elementary global
23. This was not always easy. I participated in the work of the Bureau of the
Preparatory Committee of the International Conference on Financing for
Development as a vice-president and witnessed the passion with which some
countries wanted certain NGOs or multinational corporations excluded from the list
of participants.
24. I firmly believe that the unique composition of this body is a far-reaching
precedent, and that we will witness new such "mixed bodies" and a broadening of
their areas of competency in the future.
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solidarity alongside efficient mechanisms to protect global interests
has led to disastrous consequences. Every day more than 30,000
children around the world die of preventable diseases, and about
14,000 people per day are infected with HIV. The child immunization
rate in Sub-Saharan Africa has fallen below fifty percent and it is easy
to calculate how many lives have been lost as a result. It is possible to
fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria; we know how to do it and we
can afford it, but we lack the commitment.
The Millennium Summit was the greatest gathering of heads of
states and governments. While the Millennium Development Goals
were adopted by consensus, in reality they are not being
implemented. A number of developed countries have not committed
the resources they promised, and some elite individuals in developed
countries would still rather practice corruption than good governance.
Disparities in development are striking. About 2.8 billion people still
live on less than $2 a day and the richest one percent of the world's
people receive as much income each year as fifty-seven percent of the
poorest. As I stated at the opening of the International Conference
on Financing for Development, such a world is neither just, nor
stable. To match global interdependence with global solidarity is the
key for a brighter future.
Conclusion
When addressing the issue of sovereignty, we should think more
about the future, than the past. It is predictable that the process of
globalization will continue and will likely intensify. The world's
economy, trade and financial flows will become even more integrated.
As such, improved coordination and further development of
international regulatory mechanisms, as well as the strengthening of
multilateralism, seem to be the only rational choices. Collective
efforts are essential in meeting the challenges that the world faces
today, including environmental degradation, international crime,
terrorism, AIDS and human rights violations.
The quality of state sovereignty in the contemporary world, both
in internal and external relations, has fundamentally changed.
Indeed, state sovereignty is not absolute any more. To speak about
"relative" sovereignty might from the point of the original doctrine as
defined by Bodin or Grotius, be considered as a contradictio in
adiecto, but it is useful to confront traditional concept with new
realities. Citizens all over the world are seeking to reclaim their
[Vol. 25:371
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individual sovereign rights, and want some of those rights to be
protected globally through international mechanisms which, besides
states, include international organizations, independent experts and
civil society. It is a serious challenge to reflect these changes in
transforming old or creating new institutions.
This will probably be a long process, with its ups and downs.
States that otherwise have very little in common will form some
astonishing ad hoe coalitions to oppose the transfer of power from
states to non-state actors. However, the trend is quite clear and
predictable. If citizens want to transfer some powers from states to
international organizations and NGOs, and since the power of
international corporations is already a reality, how long can states
resist these changes?
Finally, I firmly believe that this process will prove to be less
dramatic than it may seem. Just as the sharing of power instead of its
concentration on the national level was not a requiem for the state,
but a part of its democratic evolution, so will be the corresponding
transformation of international relations. In this respect, state
sovereignty is merely a conceptual veil: we should redesign it to better
fit the modem trends.
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